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A NEW CARRIER RACE?
Strategy, Force Planning, and JS Hyuga
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired)
On 18 March 2009 JS Hyuga (DDH 181) was commissioned and delivered tothe Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The unique characteris-
tic of this ship is its aircraft-carrier-like design, with a “through” flight deck and
an island on the starboard side. Hyuga was planned in the five-year Midterm De-
fense Buildup Plan (MTDBP) of 2001 and funded in Japanese fiscal year (JFY)
2004 as the replacement for the aging first-generation helicopter-carrying de-
stroyer (DDH), JS Haruna (DDH 141), which was to reach the end of its service
life of thirty-five years in 2009. The second ship of the new class, JS Ise (DDH
182), of the JFY 2006 program, was commissioned 16 March 2011. A third DDH,
an improved sister of the Hyuga-class ships, was funded in the JFY 2010 budget.
The fourth and last DDH, most likely to be a second ship of the improved type, is
to be built in the next five-year program, from JFY 2011 to 2015 (see figure 1 and
sidebar).
Several navies have built ships of this type since the
mid-1990s. These ships and their navies include HMS
Ocean (L 12) of the Royal Navy, the Mistral (L 9013)
and sisters of the French navy, Cavour (C 550) of the
Italian navy, Rey Juan Carlos I (L 61) of the Spanish
navy, and two amphibious assault ships (LHDs) of the
Canberra class in the Royal Australian Navy. In addi-
tion, the Republic of Korea Navy also operates Dok-do
(LPH 6111), which clearly belongs in this category,
and it is reported that two more of the class will be
built.
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda is a graduate of Japan’s Na-
tional Defense Academy, the JMSDF Officer Candidate
School and Naval Staff College, and, in 1992, the U.S.
Naval War College. As a vice admiral he commanded
the Fleet Escort Force (2003–2004), later serving as Di-
rector General of the Joint Staff Office, commandant of
the Sasebo JMSDF District, and as Commander in
Chief, Self-Defense Fleet, from 2007 until his retirement
in 2008. He has written widely on history and security
in both Japanese and English; his most recent English-
language article appeared in the Spring 2010 issue of
this journal. His “Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise
as a Naval Power” appeared in the Winter 2010 issue of
the Harvard Asia Quarterly.
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There are also aircraft carrier programs of other types in various navies.
These other carriers are intended more for the strike mission than for other mili-
tary roles. It is reported that the Royal Navy and French navy are jointly pursuing
a new carrier program. At the same time both the People’s Liberation Army
Navy of China and the Indian navy are on track to build their own strike carriers.
This article focuses on multipurpose through-deck carriers—not strike car-
riers, which will not be discussed here. Specifically, it examines the related mari-
time and naval strategy and force-planning concept of the JMSDF, using JS
Hyuga as the focus of the analysis.
Hyuga realizes a long-lasting dream and goal of the JMSDF, which has wanted
to be a truly capable maritime force, with escort—that is, antisubmarine warfare
(ASW)—carriers. As we will see, the concept of “escort carrier” in the JMSDF
changed several times in the process that led to the construction of Hyuga.
In 1952, seven years after the end of the Second World War, the Japan Mari-
time Guard (JMG) was established as a rudimentary defense organization for
the nation. The leaders of the JMG were determined that the organization would
be a navy, not a reinforced coast guard. Most were combat-experienced officers
(captains and below) of the former Imperial Japanese Navy, and they had clear
understanding of the difference between a coast guard–type law-enforcement
force and a navy. Two years later, the JMG was transformed into the JMSDF, and
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with leaders whose dream to build a force that had a true naval function was
stronger than ever.1 However, they also knew the difficulty of rebuilding a real
navy, in light of strict constraints imposed by the new, postwar constitution.2
Nonetheless, the JMSDF has built its forces and trained its sailors vigorously,
with this goal in view, and it is today one of the world’s truly capable maritime
forces in both quality and size. The commissioning of Hyuga represents another
step in its growth during the fifty-seven years since its origins in the JMG. The ship
also reflects the service’s strategy, the rationale of its force planning, and the oper-
ational concepts of its well-balanced fleet. As background, it is necessary to under-
stand the relationship between the defense strategy of Japan and the JMSDF.
THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE JMSDF
Since the founding of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and within it the
JMSDF, in 1954, the defense strategy of Japan has been based on the Japanese-
U.S. alliance. This posture was clearly established by article 4 of Japan’s Basic
Policy for National Defense, which was adopted by the National Defense Coun-
cil and approved by the cabinet on 20 May 1957.3 The three major defense policy
documents that have appeared since then—National Defense Program Outlines
of 1977 and 1996 and the National Defense Program Guideline of 2005—have
all confirmed that the bases of Japan’s national security and defense are the capa-
bility of the JSDF and the Japanese-U.S. alliance.4
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SELF-DEFENSE FORCE BUILDING PROGRAMS
Four years after the foundation of the Self-Defense Force, the government of
Japan began midterm defense buildup programs to provide for systematic
force building and transparency for Japanese taxpayers. Data through 2009
are drawn from Boei Handbook of 2009 [Handbook for Defense 2009] (To-
kyo: Asagumo Shinbunshya, 2009), pp. 17–146.
1954–57: four single-year budgets
1958–60: First DBP (three-year program)
1961: Single-year budget
1962–66: Second DBP (five years)
1967–71: Third DBP (five years)
1972–76: Fourth DBP (five years)
1977–79: Three single-year budgets (Post–Fourth DBP)
1980–84: 1978 Five-year JDA draft (not government program; to be reviewed
at the fourth year, 1983)
1983–87: 1981 Five-year JDA draft (not government program, to be reviewed
at the fourth year, 1986)
1986–90: 1986 MTDBP (five years)
1991–95: 1991 MTDBP (five years; amended in 1993)
1996–2000: 1996 MTDBP (five years; amended in 1998)
2001–2005: 2001 MTDBP (five years; amended in 2005)
2005–2009: 2005 MTDBP (five years; amended in 2009)
2010: Due to the political situation in Japan, a single-year budget was ac-
cepted by the cabinet on 17 December 2010, together with a 2010 National
Defense Program Guideline, in lieu of a five-year (2011–2015) MTDBP.
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Fully complying with this concept, the military strategy of the JSDF has been
to build and maintain the defense posture of the nation through cooperation
with U.S. forces under the alliance. Exceptions would be the outbreak of military
conflict or limited aggression against Japan, in which case the JSDF would be
solely responsible for appropriate military measures. Thus the operational con-
cept of the JSDF with respect to the U.S. armed forces has been one of comple-
mentary mission-sharing, in which U.S. forces concentrate on offensive
operations, while the JSDF maximizes its capability for defensive operations. In
other words, the two forces form what is known as a “spear and shield”relationship.
For instance, under this policy the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)
remains on Japanese territory and prepares for enemy invasion, while U.S. Army
and Marine Corps forces prepare for and conduct expeditionary operations
against enemy forces outside Japan. In case of an invasion, these three ground
forces would fight together on Japanese soil.
Similarly, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is to be engaged solely in
the defense of Japanese airspace, providing overall safety and security to the Jap-
anese people and to U.S. forces in Japan. Thus the JASDF relieves the U.S. Air
Force of the heavy burden of defense around Japan. This enables Air Force units
to allocate extra assets for strike and other operations conducted against the
enemy.
As for maritime operations, ensuring the safety and security of the waters
around Japan is the most important mission of the JMSDF. In this way the
JMSDF ensures that Japan can receive American reinforcements from across the
Pacific Ocean, guarantees the safety of U.S. naval forces operating around Japan,
and enables U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to concentrate on strike opera-
tions against enemy naval forces and land targets. At the same time, for Japan, as
a country with few natural resources and little domestic food production, the
safety of merchant shipping is a matter of national survival in crisis or wartime.
All of these operations are grouped under the heading of protection of sea lines
of communication (SLOCs) in the northwestern Pacific. The JMSDF has ac-
cepted these simple realities as the essence of its strategic objectives.
Proceeding from this defense strategy, the main missions of the JMSDF have
consistently been defined as the protection of SLOCs and the defense of the
homeland in case of direct invasion. In support of this defense strategy and its
two main missions, in turn, the JMSDF has set antisubmarine warfare as its
main task. The operational concept under the Japanese-U.S. alliance is that in
case of a national or regional contingency, the U.S. Navy would deploy CSGs
into the seas surrounding Japan, to provide the strike capability lacking in the
JMSDF to oblige the enemy to give up its intention of invading Japan or attack-
ing its SLOCs. It would be necessary to exclude firmly the enemy’s submarines,
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which could pose the greatest threat to CSG operations in Japanese waters and to
the safety of the SLOCs around Japan. As a result of this logic, ASW was made
the main pillar of JMSDF missions. Even in the present security environment,
twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the threat of invasion from the
Soviet Union, two factors are unchanged—the Japanese-U.S. alliance and Ja-
pan’s dependence on imported natural resources. Therefore the protection of
SLOCs has continued to be a main mission of the JMSDF.
Homeland defense, of course, remains as a mission as well, however unlikely
its occurrence. It is based on the assumption of a direct invasion into Japan by an
enemy ground forces. This would certainly be a state of national emergency, and
each branch of the JSDF would do its best to repel the enemy. At the same time,
homeland defense operations would involve many unforeseeable factors, such as
how and where enemy forces invade and how U.S. forces would assist the JSDF;
projecting countermeasures and courses of action for all possible cases is com-
plicated. In any case, certain operations associated with the protection of
SLOCs—for example, establishing and maintaining conditions necessary for
U.S. forces arriving in the waters around Japan—contribute also to homeland
defense.
In other words, it is inappropriate to consider separately the operations re-
quired for each mission. Accordingly, the JMSDF has made it a basic policy to
address the homeland-defense mission by giving full priority to the warfare ca-
pabilities, especially ASW, required for the SLOC-protection mission, in the be-
lief that it can best contribute to Japan’s homeland security by defeating
invasion forces at sea.
SHIPBORNE HELICOPTERS, DESTROYERS, AND FRIGATES OF
WORLD NAVIES
In addition to the JMSDF defense strategy, some discussion of the historical de-
velopment of naval helicopters, destroyers, and frigates generally is necessary to
understanding the rationale of JMSDF’s force buildup, especially in destroyers
and helicopters.
Various navies paid close attention after World War II to the improvement of
submarine capabilities, numbers, and quality, as well as to the development of
helicopters. They made sustained efforts to combine helicopters and surface ves-
sels in order to improve antisubmarine effectiveness. Various combinations
were tested, notably with helicopter-capable surface vessels, mainly in the
United Kingdom, by the Royal Navy. Directly and indirectly influenced by such
efforts, many European navies started in the 1960s to operate small helicopters
on board destroyers (DDs) and the smaller, more specialized frigate (FF) type.
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The biggest issue was to limit the movement (mainly rolling) of surface ships
of only two or three thousand tons—a typical size in those years—enough to
make it possible to handle and operate helicopters on board. The Royal Navy had
developed successful fin stabilizers for ship’s hulls, and their use spread very
quickly. As for the shipboard helicopter, small aircraft like the Wasp and Bell 204
were used initially, followed by the Bell 212 and Lynx, with their improved per-
formance. In recent years, however, the growth of the submarine threat and the
diversification and complexity of navy missions have led naval force planners to
recognize the limitations of small helicopters, such as poor endurance and in-
sufficient combat systems. Therefore, most world navies are today introducing
helicopters of medium to large size, like the EH-101 and NH-90. Simulta-
neously, the Royal Canadian Navy has undergone a unique process in this area.
In the 1960s, it developed a concept for the embarkation of a large helicopter, the
HSS-2 (later redesignated in the U.S. Navy as the SH-3), a cutting-edge aircraft in
those days, on board its 2,500-ton destroyers. Even with fin stabilizers, a destroyer-
sized ship could not safely handle, launch, or recover the larger HSS-2 in rough
seas. An engineering team from Canada’s navy and industry produced an on-
board helicopter-handling/arresting system called Beartrap, which became in-
dispensable. In the 1970s, the Canadian navy built four Iroquois-class DDHs of
4,500 tons, larger than previous Canadian destroyers; each could carry two
HSS-2s. This class underwent modernization in the 1990s, and three units, aged
more than thirty-five years, remained in active service as of December 2010.5
The U.S. Navy, in contrast, did not for a long period after World War II form a
clear concept of combining DD/FF types with helicopters for antisubmarine
warfare. Instead, in 1960s and 1970s it used Essex-class aircraft carriers as ASW
carriers (CVSs), with S-2 antisubmarine maritime-patrol aircraft and HSS-1
(later known as the H-34) and HSS-2 helicopters on board. This was a superb
ASW capability, but as the Soviet Union’s submarine threat became increasingly
prominent, the U.S. steadily endeavored to strengthen its ASW capability, espe-
cially that of surface ships in conjunction with P-3 aircraft and state-of-the-art
technologies. By the early 1960s, U.S. Navy ships could project Mark 44 homing
torpedoes as far as ten thousand yards away, using the ASROC (antisubmarine
rocket) system. To extend this range to match longer detection distances, the
Americans developed the radio-controlled DASH (drone antisubmarine heli-
copter); however, the system was abandoned due to technological limitations
and poor reliability.6
With the failure of DASH, the U.S. Navy started to embark small, multipur-
pose, manned helicopters on surface vessels. The Navy also introduced the
AN/SQR-18A variable-depth-sonar towed-array sonar system (VDS-TASS) and
added it to the existing AN/SQS-35 VDS system to detect the relatively noisy
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first-generation Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)—for exam-
ple, the Hotel, Echo, and November classes—and snorkeling, conventionally
powered boats. By this time the Mark 46 torpedo, with substantially improved
performance over the previous Mark 44, had become operational too.
The U.S. Navy’s concept of ASW operations was now to get initial acoustic
(“passive,” or listening) contact by VDS-TASS on board destroyers or frigates
and then develop the approximate position of the target submarine by continu-
ous tracking. The passive-detection range of TASS is in general much greater
than that of a ship’s hull-mounted sonar used in an active mode, but also several
times greater than the maximum firing range of the ASROC. It thus gives surface
units the safety of greater distance, but without an appropriate attack weapon,
they cannot take advantage of this long-range detection. It was for this reason
that the concept of pairing ships with light helicopters was developed in the U.S.
Navy.
In a tactical ASW situation, a surface unit deploys helicopters against the con-
tact to determine whether it is really a submarine. If it is, the helicopter fixes its
position using sonobuoys; if the submarine is identified as an enemy, the heli-
copter attacks it with a Mark 46 torpedo. A new helicopter was developed for not
only this sequence and type of operation but also antisurface surveillance and
targeting, search and rescue, and transport—the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose
System (LAMPS), of which the SH-2 became known as the “Mark I.”
Due to its size, the LAMPS Mark I was equipped not with dipping sonar but
with magnetic-anomaly-detection (MAD) gear, along with sonobuoys, to fix the
location of a submerged boat. Other than ASW systems, the Mark I was also
equipped with surface-surveillance radar. This radar system made LAMPS indis-
pensable for over-the-horizon targeting of the new Harpoon surface-to-surface
missile (SSM), which had just become operational in the U.S. Navy.
The operational record of the LAMPS Mark I was highly satisfactory. All
forty-six frigates of the Knox (FF 1052) class, initially planned for DASH, were
converted to LAMPS, through redesign of their hangars and installation of
sonobuoy data-processing systems. These ships were a mainstay of American
ASW through the 1970s and 1980s.
The successor to LAMPS I, known as LAMPS Mark III, was based on the
SH-60 helicopter, a standard helicopter in all U.S. services at the time. More than
140 surface vessels embarked the SH-60, ranging from Oliver Hazard Perry–class
guided-missile frigates to “Flight IIA” Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile de-
stroyers (DDGs), and to aircraft carriers. On board Aegis guided-missile cruis-
ers and DDGs equipped with the Aegis combat system, the SH-60 is an
indispensable asset. It supports the AN/SQQ-89 comprehensive ASW system,
which in turn combines the AN/SQR-19 Tactical TASS (TACTASS), the
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AN/SQS-53 hull-mounted sonar, and ASW-related software. The SQQ-89 is
considered to be the most advanced surface-ship ASW system in the world
today.
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS IN THE JMSDF: THE MID-1950S AND
1960S
Naval helicopters were introduced in 1953, one year after the foundation of the
JMG. In those days, all efforts were focused on obtaining a large number of sur-
face vessels, such as the World War II–vintage patrol frigates and landing sup-
port ships, transferred from the U.S. Navy. Emphasis was also placed on training
shipboard personnel to meet the rapidly growing requirements of this force.
However, consideration was also given to maritime aviation, in order to pave
the way for its future development. This was a legacy from the Imperial Japanese
Navy, whose naval aviation force had been the second-largest in the world dur-
ing World War II but had totally disappeared by the end of the war. In addition to
fixed-wing aircraft, such as PV-2s, TBMs, and PBYs—all of which were also of
World War II vintage—initial attempts to introduce several types of helicopters,
including the Bell 47, were made. This was the period of the Korean War, so it
was difficult for the JMG to get helicopters from the U.S. Navy. Therefore, sec-
ondhand S-51 and S-55 helicopters were imported from the United Kingdom.
These two types were mainly used for pilot training and for establishing opera-
tional concepts for the future helicopter force. Later, two squadrons were estab-
lished, each equipped with eight HSS-1 and nine night-capable HSS-1N
helicopters, then cutting-edge U.S. Navy aircraft. Finally the helicopter force of
the JMSDF was ready for missions, but its inventory was still very small. At that
time, the deployment concept for helicopters in the JMSDF envisioned the de-
fense of vital local areas, such as major ports, straits, and channels; it presumed
operation from shore air bases—not from ships.
Beyond these practical matters of force planning and building during its early
days, the JMSDF had an independent strategic concept, an ambitious plan to
build an innovative ASW group, formed around a helicopter carrier. In outline,
that concept recognized that surface vessels have natural limitations in antisub-
marine warfare; submarines, whether conventionally or nuclear powered, ma-
neuver cunningly and aggressively to avoid detection by surface units before
attacking, and nuclear submarines can retreat at high speed after attacking. The
inherent limitations of surface ships against these “invisible adversaries” include
low probability of detection, difficulty of classification and identification of
contacts, short detection range relative to that of a submarine against a surface
ship, and the submarine’s tactical advantages in tactical use of the ocean envi-
ronment. To make up for these handicaps, JMSDF planners considered it
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indispensable to employ helicopters, with their prominent ASW capabilities, in
combination with surface ships. The abilities of helicopters to conduct wide-
area surveillance and search and to detect and track fast and hard-maneuvering
contacts were especially attractive characteristics. In addition, if a surface force
could conduct ASW by helicopters at a distance, its own safety and survivability
would substantially increase.
So, on the basis of this thinking, the JMSDF devised a concept for an ASW
—or “hunter/killer” (HUK)—group, a small-to-medium-sized ASW helicopter
carrier with escort destroyers. To realize this concept, the JMSDF Maritime Staff
Office (MSO) in Tokyo developed a plan for two variants: “CVH-a,” of twenty
thousand tons, with eighteen helicopters and four to six S-2 fixed-wing mari-
time patrol aircraft; and “CVH-b,” of ten thousand tons, with eighteen helicop-
ters (see figure 2).
It was decided that CVH-b would be more suitable for the JMSDF, and the Ja-
pan Defense Agency (or JDA, the predecessor of the present Ministry of De-
fense) decided to request one CVH-b in the JFY 1961 budget. But this decision
was caught up in political turmoil originating from stiff opposition to the revi-
sion of the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960. This political friction, caused
by relatively minor opposition groups, escalated into nationwide social chaos. In
order that this controversial CVH not become a symbolic target for these oppo-
nents, the JDA withdrew its proposal. At the same time, due to the chaotic situa-
tion, the second of the JDA’s Defense Buildup Plans (DBPs) was postponed by
one year; to fill the one-year gap, an independent, single-year budget, for JFY
K O D A 3 9
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1961, not part of a five-year DBP, was requested. CVH construction was not in-
cluded and was never discussed again in later years. This was the first demise of
the JMSDF helicopter carrier.7
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the JMSDF started receiving the seven de-
stroyers of the Ayanami class (2,200 tons, ASW, three-inch guns) and the three
sisters of the Murasame class (2,400 tons, antiair warfare [AAW] and antisurface
warfare, five-inch guns). These were the JMSDF’s first generation of DDs,
planned from 1955 to 1958. Construction of its first state-of-the-art DDG, of
4,500 tons, with the Tartar surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, was approved in
the 1961 JDA budget. For the JMSDF, a DDG was too expensive to build in large
numbers, so the JMSDF traded quantity for its superb AAW capability. This re-
quest was regarded as something of a “leap in the dark,” one that might have
eaten up the other shipbuilding programs. Only one, JS Amatsukaze (DDG 163),
was built, and it took the JMSDF ten years to request a second Tartar DDG.
These were the realities of Japan and the JMSDF around 1960. In retrospect,
in those days of the infancy of the force buildup, if the CVH had been approved,
whatever its cost, it would certainly have caused serious negative impacts upon
almost all sections of the JMSDF. It might have become a hard-to-remove (and
self-imposed) obstacle for future force planning. Additionally, if we take into ac-
count the performance and quality of helicopters around 1960 and the state of
passive acoustic sensors in the JMSDF at that time, it is doubtful if this HUK
group could have achieved its mission.
Having said that, however, the point here is that the idea of a CVH, or some
form of helicopter carrier, had become a feature of JMSDF force planning and
would remain so through the coming decades.
THE THIRD AND FOURTH DBPS AND THE FIRST STANDARD
TACTICAL UNIT
In 1964 the JMSDF started introducing U.S.-developed HSS-2 ASW helicopters.
But the operational concept of helicopter force still remained the same—local
vital-area defense, conducted from air bases ashore.
It was during its preparatory study for the Third DBP (1967–71) that the
MSO concluded that helicopters were indispensable assets for the ASW opera-
tions of surface forces. The presumed threat at that time was a conventional sub-
marine (SS) attempting a torpedo attack against a surface force. The threat from
the air was, in those early Cold War days, considered to be scattered air raids,
mainly free-fall bombing by small numbers of long-range bombers. Of course,
SSNs, SSMs, and air-to-surface antiship missiles (ASMs) were examined as well;
however, in the mid-1960s, in the northwest Pacific, these threats were estimated
to be secondary.
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The JMSDF conducted extensive mathematical operations-research analyses
of these threat scenarios and came to the following conclusion: a surface force of
eight destroyers with six shipboard ASW helicopters would be the most effective
against a single SS attempting to make torpedo attacks, supported by sporadic
bombing by long-range bombers.
The six ASW helicopters in total—four available for operations at any one
time—were to be used as “reaction assets”—that is, to investigate contacts
gained or to conduct counterattacks. They were not considered to be primary
search assets against the enemy SS. Instead, once contact was gained, the four
were to be sent to the contact area to track the submarine and eventually to kill it,
when tactical conditions were met.
One issue to be resolved in this concept was how to embark the six helicop-
ters. The JMSDF thought it impracticable to embark the large HSS-2 on board
2,500-ton DDs. The options left were to build either two helicopter-carrying de-
stroyers of seven thousand tons full load (FL), which would carry three helicop-
ters each, or a single, larger DDH, of nine to ten thousand tons, capable of
carrying all six. The latter would most likely be a through-deck design, but that
was too controversial politically. It was still too early to make a serious argument
for a ship that looked something like an attack carrier, even if it was in fact sim-
ply an ASW helicopter platform. Thus the decision was made to build two
seven-thousand-ton DDHs, conventional destroyers with large hangars for
three ASW helicopters, and wide flight decks extending from the midsection to
the stern.
On this basis, the JMSDF’s antisubmarine warfare concept was reflected in
the composition of a new type of “escort flotilla”: one DDG, with the Tartar
SAM, to be responsible for force air defense; two DDHs, each of 6,500 tons and
carrying three ASW helicopters; and five DDs for general operations. Two DDHs
were included in each of the next two DBPs, the third and fourth, for a total of
four. One of the technical premises for this concept was, needless to say, the suc-
cessful development and diffusion of Beartrap and of fin stabilizers.
The escort flotilla, whose main mission was ASW, was expected to improve
the fleet’s antisubmarine capability substantially.8 Its conceptual composition,
as described above, was implemented: the escort flotilla of eight ships and six an-
tisubmarine helicopters became a standard tactical unit for the first time.9 There
had been escort flotillas in the JMSDF before, but those were, in general, the
spiritual descendants of the traditional destroyer flotillas of the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy, which had been used as heavy torpedo-assault forces, without aircraft
and without a thought-out operational concept.
The first DDH was Haruna (see figure 3), commissioned in February 1973;
in November 1974, when the second, JS Hiei (DDH 142), was commissioned,
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Escort Division 51 was organized; Hiei and Haruna joined its Escort Flotilla 1.
The third DDH, of a slightly larger (seven-thousand ton) class, was JS Shirane
(DDH 143), commissioned in March 1980; with the commissioning of the
fourth, JS Kurama (DDH 144), the next year, Escort Division 52 was formed, and
the two Shirane-class DDHs were assigned to its Escort Flotilla 2.
So by 1981 the JMSDF had four flotillas, of which two had completed the
transition to an eight ships/six helicopters composition. The other two flotillas
remained in a premodernized state at that point. One thing to be noted here was
the time elapsed from the concept’s original development, in 1965, to its realization
—it had taken over fifteen years to realize the concept, and then only halfway. This is
the reality of the time-consuming nature of naval force building.
POST-FOURTH DBP AND A NEW CONCEPT
Due to the fourth Middle East war, in October 1973, a quick and substantial
jump in the price of crude oil, the “oil shock,” hit the world. Its negative effects
were felt in almost all sectors of the economy in Japan and led to unprecedented
and rapid inflation. Japan’s defense industry was no exception, and some dis-
ruption, like the cancelations of several shipbuilding contracts for new vessels,
was proposed by industry and reluctantly accepted by the government. In this
situation, the midterm financial estimate, the basis for next five-year DBP, be-
came unclear. As a result, the government and the JDA gave up formulating a
new DBP; instead, three consecutive single-year budgets were adopted. This in-
terval, from JFY 1977 through 1979, where no defense buildup plan was in effect,
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was called the “Post–Fourth DBP” (P-4) period. Eventually, and ironically, the
P-4 period had a remarkable significance for the JMSDF. In these years, in the
middle of the Cold War, the JMSDF developed a new operational concept to
meet growing threats. This concept became the centerpiece and theoretical main
pillar of JMSDF force planning, and it remains so today, over thirty years later.
The new concept was to form large tactical units of eight DDG/DDs and eight
antisubmarine helicopters.
During the P-4 period, the MSO recognized the limits of a surface flotilla
with eight ships and six ASW helicopters against the Soviet Union’s increasing
numbers of new-generation SSNs and its growing naval aviation arm. An SS
with torpedoes remained a fearsome opponent, but now SSNs with an SSM ca-
pability posed a new and serious threat to surface forces. As for the air threat,
air-to-surface missile attack had totally replaced conventional bombing. The
tactics of air attack had also switched, from scattered bombing to controlled and
repeated assaults by waves of ASM-loaded bomber formations, over waters dis-
tant from the mainland of the USSR. In general, new intelligence on Soviet naval
capabilities changed the threat perception of the JMSDF quickly and substan-
tially. It was full recognition of these changes in the threat that led the MSO to
review the existing concept of eight ships with six helicopters.
With regard to ASW, coping with highly maneuverable SSNs, with their great
submerged speed and endurance, requires detection, tracking, and attack at
longer ranges from surface units. That made the shipboard passive acoustic sensor
—the tactical towed-array sonar—essential. Together with TACTASS, the passive
sonobuoy was thought to be effective in initial search against SSNs. For this rea-
son, two more helicopters were added to the original six, for reactive operations.
As for AAW, one Tartar DDG was considered insufficient to protect the unit
against fierce ASM and SSM attacks, delivered in volume. So the number of DDGs
was increased to two, replacing one of the DDHs, and a domestically developed,
short-range SAM, which would launch the NATO-developed Sea Sparrow, was to
be installed on all the unit’s DDHs and DDs for point defense. As a result of this
review, a new “eight ships with eight helicopters” initiative was adopted.10
There was a further attempt to improve the ASW capability of the JMSDF. It
was obvious ASW by surface units, even with helicopters, had limitations, so in
addition to the eight ships/eight helicopters concept, the JMSDF decided to ob-
tain a hundred P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. Of these, eighty would be allo-
cated to wide-area surveillance and twenty for direct support to surface units.
This integrated antisubmarine warfare posture has been the real force-building
rationale of the JMSDF since 1980.
The biggest issue was embarking an ASW helicopter on a four-thousand-ton
destroyer; each of the flotilla’s five DDs (of a new class, to be designed for the
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purpose) would have to carry one. To meet fully the operational requirement of
the new concept, each aircraft would need sonobuoy and dipping-sonar sys-
tems, as well as MAD. Additionally, a surface surveillance radar would be desir-
able. However, the small-to-medium-sized helicopters suitable for DDs were
limited to the U.S. Navy’s SH-2 and the Royal Navy’s Lynx, which were both too
small and had too little payload. The idea of two different types of helicopters
—large and small helicopters, for DDHs and DDs, respectively—was aban-
doned as operationally inefficient. Only a large helicopter could meet the need,
but it had to be small enough to be stored in a hangar and to take off from and
land on the flight deck of a four-thousand-ton DD.
After intensive and in-depth research, the MSO concluded that only the
HSS-2, which was in current use, could meet these conflicting requirements. But
the HSS-2 was equipped only with a dipping-sonar system. At that time, the U.S.
Navy had had a similar idea (except for use on carriers) and had started develop-
ment of a new HSS-2 variant—what would become the SH-3H—but the JMSDF
learned of difficulties in that program.
For this reason, the JMSDF decided to install domestically developed equip-
ment on the existing HSS-2. The development effort went well, and a new mem-
ber of the globally popular HSS-2 family—with a completely different
capability, including a surface-search radar in an extendable “radome”—was
introduced into the JMSDF, the HSS-2B (see figure 4). Given this success in de-
veloping the HSS-2B, the JMSDF was finally able to design and build the new de-
stroyer to handle it, the Hatsuyuki (DD 122) class. Eventually the Hatsuyuki class
paved the way to the realization of the eight ships/eight helicopters concept. The
JMSDF now started forming its escort flotillas anew; each would be composed
of one DDH with three ASW helicopters, five destroyers with one helicopter
each, and two Tartar DDGs.
Since then, destroyer-borne helicopters in the JMSDF have switched to the
new-generation SH-60J (1989), followed by the improved and enlarged SH-60K
(2003). Equipment has also been improved, together with technology and tac-
tics. For instance, later production models of the SH-60J were equipped with a
forward-looking infrared system and a chaff/flare dispenser for self-defense.
The SH-60K has a ship-landing guidance system, for operations in poor visibil-
ity. Provision is also made for installation of a machine gun and short-range
air-to-surface missile. However, their basic operational concept, originating
with the HSS-2B, has remained the same. In the same way, more modern and
larger destroyers have appeared—Asagiri class (4,500 tons, eight ships), the
Murasame class (6,300 tons, nine ships), then the Onami class (6,500 tons, five
ships)—but their operational concept is that associated with the first-generation
Hatsuyuki class.
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In the eight ships/eight helicopters composition, only one aircraft was em-
barked on each DD. However, to provide operational flexibility, the enlargement
of their hangar bays to accommodate two ASW helicopters (a type known ge-
nerically as HS) was attempted; the hangar on board JS Asagiri was modified
during construction. That attempt was not satisfactory; however, in the next
class, beginning with JS Murasame, provision was made in the design phase to
accommodate two SH-60J/Ks at one time. This is officially known as the “one
HS embarked and one HS carried” design, and it greatly improved flexibility in
missions in the Indian Ocean (supporting ENDURING FREEDOM) and off the
coast of Somalia (antipiracy). However, these operations are considered to be vari-
ations, adaptations of the fundamental eight ships/eight helicopters concept.
THE MID-1980S: “AT-SEA AIR-DEFENSE POSTURE STUDY” AND
THE DDV
In response to the growing threat posed by Soviet Long-Range Aviation in the
late 1970s and 1980s, the JDA in 1986 launched an intra-agency research project
called the At-Sea Air-Defense Posture Study.11 This study, which continued until
1987, was conducted in a period of sharp confrontation between the West and
East, the final years of the Cold War. The MSO proposed two systems: the
“DDV” (a through-deck carrier for air-interceptor fighters) and an Aegis DDG.
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It estimated the Soviet naval-aviation threat as one of concentrated ASM attacks
by bombers like the Tu-22M Backfire, in about three groups, each aircraft carry-
ing two AS-4 or AS-6 long-range missiles. The proposed Aegis DDG would be
able to shoot down large numbers of incoming ASMs but would be unable to
deal with the bombers themselves, attacking from beyond the maximum range
of the SM-2 surface-to-air missile of the JMSDF’s Aegis system. For this reason,
if the tempo of combat increased or the campaign was prolonged or repeated,
the bombers would survive and their attacks would continue forever, in theory,
while surface units would suffer accumulated losses to missiles “leaking
through” in every assault and might ultimately be destroyed completely.
The JMSDF strongly felt the need for an adequate antibomber (that is, anti–
ASM platform) asset. One idea was to operate short-takeoff/vertical-landing
(STOVL) interceptor fighters from a mother ship, a DDV. That concept envi-
sioned a through-deck ship of fifteen to twenty thousand tons with about ten radar-
equipped Sea Harrier all-weather interceptors and about four airborne-early-
warning aircraft. However, on New Year’s Day in 1988, a sensational article titled
“JMSDF to Build Light Aircraft Carrier” was front-paged by nationally circulated
newspapers and became somewhat controversial politically.12
The MSO turned down the DDV concept due to the negative resonance of the
phrase “aircraft carrier” for political and public opinion and within the study
panel itself. Then, the senior leaders of the JMSDF decided to focus on the Aegis
DDG; after heated discussions about funding, the ship was included in the JFY
1988 budget.13 The feeling within the MSO was bittersweet: the JMSDF finally
obtained the most advanced antiair-warfare ship but had had to trade away, in
the DDV, its long-hoped-for air-capable ship.14
At least the JMSDF had been able to put a carrier-like combatant—though far
different from the once-envisioned ASW helicopter carrier in task and mission
—on the agenda again. So this, the second demise of the carrier in the JMSDF,
became another important milestone along the road to JS Hyuga. The CVH and
DDV had been only JMSDF concepts, not government-approved programs, and
so had ended as mere dreams. However, it was a stark reality that replacements
for the Harunas would have to be laid down in the first decade after 2000, when
they would reach the end of their service lives.
THE OOSUMI-CLASS LST: A SIGNPOST TO THE FUTURE
A ship somewhat related to the Haruna-class DDH follow-on—known as the
Next-Generation DDH, or Next DDH, program—was a new transport ship in
the JFY 1993 budget, JS Oosumi (LST 4001). Oosumi was a fundamental departure
from the previous Miura-class LST (landing ship, tank).15 Its operational re-
quirement, which called for a maximum speed of more than twenty knots,
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inevitably narrowed its design. The traditional, World War II design based on a
bow door and ramp for direct beaching was abandoned, and a narrower,
higher-speed hull form was introduced. At the same time, in order to fulfill the
basic requirement for beach landing, as military transport, the MSO decided to
embark on this ship what was at the time a cutting-edge amphibious vehicle, the
U.S. Navy’s Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC).
The MSO also looked into the possibility of conducting landing operations
by helicopters from this ship. However, there was some tacit resistance within
the JDA regarding carrier-like through-deck designs, so the MSO had to be care-
ful on this point. The MSO argued the necessity of a through-deck design for the
safety of helicopter operations and efficiency of embarkation and debarkation
of troops. After heated discussions within the JDA, the MSO finalized Oosumi
(see figure 5) as a through-deck transport, designating it as an LST. The JMSDF
did not adopt the traditional concept of amphibious assault, in which the ship
would operate helicopters in a combat environment. Instead, the JMSDF intro-
duced a substantially different idea, “Maritime Operational Transport.”16 The
MSO strongly advocated the through-deck design in support of such a capabil-
ity. Needless to say, however, the crux of the debate was whether to adopt a
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through-deck structure. Ultimately the design was accepted by the JDA and the
government of Japan.
All this time, during these heated JDA discussions, there was a strong aware-
ness in the minds of officers in the MSO that the Next DDH project was waiting
in the wings.
THE NEXT-GENERATION DDH
A complicated, two-year-long effort produced a new, five-year Midterm Defense
Buildup Plan (the 2001–2005 MTDBP). In it, for 2001, was the Next DDH (see
figure 6), a “destroyer with sophisticated command and communication capa-
bility, as well as improved helicopters operational capability.”17
Operational Concept
As one proposed configuration for this vessel, the JDA had released to the mass
media a conceptual picture of a ship with a superstructure amidships and a di-
vided forward-and-aft flight deck. This seems to have been done to offset poten-
tial public objections rooted in the offensive image of aircraft carriers.18
This ship was planned as a replacement for the existing DDHs for the new
JMSDF eight ships/eight helicopters concept, based on a threat perception of
SSNs/SSs and ASM-equipped bombers. The concept was considered an optimum
posture, based on the enormous amount of mathematical operations-research
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analysis conducted since the Post–Fourth DBP. What the analysts tried to deter-
mine was the best composition of a JMSDF flotilla to survive intensive enemy
air-to-surface attacks while continuing effective antisubmarine warfare for a
certain duration of time.
When the MSO started to develop the operational concept for the Next DDG,
the force-planning rationale of ASW as the main mission of the JMSDF was still
a given. It followed that SSM-capable submarines and ASM-carrying bombers
were (and remain) the most relevant and realistic threats. In other words, the
JMSDF thought then, thinks today, and expects to think in the future that the
“best” surface force is one that has true capabilities against air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface missiles and against submarines.
Here, the importance of continuity of defense concept should be emphasized.
The eight-ship/six–ASW helicopter concept of the Third DBP was only partially
realized, even fifteen years after its initial development. At that point, only two
out of four flotillas conformed to it. This, as noted, reflects the time-consuming
nature of assembling a surface force, building at the rate of only one or two ves-
sels per year. Frequent changes of defense or operational concepts would have
brought few positive results and caused confusion and ultimately meant failure
to achieve force-building objectives. Accordingly, since the Post–Fourth DBP
period no fundamental change that could reverse the premises of the estimate
has been accepted; the eight ships/eight ASW helicopters concept has been up-
held for about thirty years. By 1998, about twenty years after this composition
was formulated, all four JMSDF destroyer flotillas were organized in line with it:
one DDH, five DDs, two DDGs, with eight HS aircraft. These flotillas, in turn,
have been the rationale for modernization. Today the JMSDF has four fully or-
ganized flotillas that are probably second in quality only to the U.S. Navy—
world-class surface units with the most capable helicopters. This is a result of
more than a quarter-century of continuity in defense concept within the JMSDF.
A Carrier-like Ship
In line with that defense concept, the MSO decided that the basic characteristic
of the Next DDH, its bottom line, would be an ability to operate three helicop-
ters. However, though it was committed to the eight ships/eight helicopters con-
cept, extensive fleet experience eventually convinced the MSO that even three
helicopters would not meet real-world ASW needs.
The operations-research mathematical model used in the development of
eight ships/eight helicopters had postulated broad and universal conditions, as-
suming a simplified scenario of ASW against one submarine (nuclear or con-
ventional) whose presence in an area had been confirmed. The model’s output,
K O D A 4 9
NWC_2011SummerReview_Koda.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Thursday, April 28, 2011 1:21:05 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
19
Koda: A New Carrier Race?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
then, answered to this specific condition, which had been the basis for the doc-
trine then existing. The gaps between the force-planning rationale and the real-
ity of widely diverse operational environments and conditions are obvious. The
JMSDF has long and wisely exercised flexibility, especially at the fleet level, to
bridge this gap.
Commander in Chief, JMSDF Fleet (CinC SDF) normally forms flotillas with
compositions most suitable to achieve given missions in given situations. For ex-
ample, where a flotilla’s mission is relatively uncomplicated mission, CinC SDF
may allocate fewer ships to its commander—and, of course, the reverse is also
true. In the case of a difficult mission requiring larger forces than the standard,
CinC SDF may reinforce the flotilla.
Most ordinary training, exercise, and operations are carried out with the nor-
mal eight ships/eight helicopters organization. But practical fleet ASW experi-
ence has taught an important lesson—that the number of ASW helicopters on a
single DDH and in an entire flotilla is insufficient. In a real-world scenario, ships
and helicopters may gain several contacts at once and have to categorize each as a
submarine or a false detection. Then the real submarines, or most submarine-
like contacts, are tracked and identified as friendly or enemy; finally, adversaries
are attacked. In short, actual ASW engagements start with large numbers of un-
certain contacts, to which the flotilla commander should be able to project heli-
copters to investigate. In fact, the MSO postulated a simultaneous projection of
three or four helicopters for each contact.
Additionally, for other roles, the MSO also decided to add one MCH-101 heli-
copter, for airborne mine countermeasures and transport. But three ASW heli-
copters on board the Next DDH was a bottom line; the ship was to represent a
concentrated helicopter capability in various tactical ASW situations. Thus, a
rationale for the maximum number of aircraft on the Next DDH was developed
based on the thinking that as a member of a flotilla of eight ships and eight ASW
helicopters, the ship would normally carry three ASW and one mine-warfare/
transport helicopters—that is, three HS and one MCH. To cope with real-world
ASW operations, in fact, the ship might need to embark about ten HS.
All this made it natural and reasonable for the MSO to adopt a carrier-like
hull design, with a through flight deck, a starboard island structure, and a large
hangar bay under the flight deck. The design accommodated three HS plus one
MCH under normal conditions and about ten HS in case of expanded helicopter
operations.
However, as Next DDH development continued, another problem arose. In
the past, the JMSDF had fielded four antisubmarine helicopter squadrons for
shipboard operations—one for each flotilla—and four squadrons for vital/local-
area defense from air bases. The shipboard squadrons each had twelve aircraft,
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enough to deploy eight to the ships in a flotilla. The land-based HS squadrons
were not intended or fully trained for shipboard operations. So there were
forty-eight HS helicopters, with about a hundred aircrew teams, available for
shipboard operation in all. In order to allow embarkation of as many as ten HS
aircraft on the Next DDH, additional HS strength would be necessary.
The MSO decided to make all land-based HS squadrons shipboard capable.
Concrete measures were implemented in the JFY 2007 program, as part of a re-
organization of the JMSDF decreasing the number of destroyers but increasing
the number of helicopters to be embarked on board both DDs and the Next
DDH. A gradual transition of land-based squadrons from land to shipboard op-
eration got started. It is now estimated that by around 2015, all HS helicopters in
the JMSDF—that is, about eighty aircraft—will become shipboard capable. This
number is considered to be right to meet the requirements of maximum ship-
board operations in case of necessity.
Another reason as well drove the MSO strongly toward the through-deck de-
sign. That was an operational requirement for simultaneous takeoffs by multiple
ASW helicopters, preferably at least three. This would solve a limitation of the
first-generation DDHs, from which only one helicopter could take off at one
time. Thanks to the Beartrap (in later years, the Recovery Assist Securing Tra-
versing, or RAST, system), the time needed for the second aircraft to take off was
acceptable, to some extent, but it really took a long time for the third. The prob-
lem was the constrained size of the flight deck, which occupied only one-third of
the ship’s overall length, and the limited number of arresting-traverse systems
—that is, two RASTs for three helicopters. The same was also true for landings.
The MSO was afraid that this inherent handicap might become a serious prob-
lem in a real-world multicontact environment. To the MSO, the best (and only)
way to resolve it was to adopt a through-deck design for the Next DDH.
Additionally, the MSO placed emphasis on the importance of an elevator that
would lift an SH-60 helicopter with its rotors unfolded and of sufficient height
in the hangar to allow rotor-related work on an MH-53E, the largest helicopter
in service. The JMSDF especially wanted such an elevator in the Next DDH, be-
cause a traditional destroyer-type hangar does not allow repair work on a heli-
copter whose rotor cannot be folded. The only option in such a case is to send the
helicopter to a land base and embark a replacement. This meant not only a tem-
porary decrease in the number of HS on board and in the flotilla, but also, in
some cases, a destroyer off its station, while it rushed to a point that placed the
air base within the endurance arc of the aircraft. This posed a far greater restric-
tion on force operations than previously thought, and therefore the JMSDF par-
ticularly sought a suitable elevator in the Next DDH.
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Command and Control
The Next DDH was planned not only as one of the eight ships in a flotilla but
also as the flotilla commander’s flagship. It would need a sophisticated Flag In-
formation Center (FIC) in addition to an ordinary Combat Information Center
(CIC). Provisions of various sorts would have to be made to accommodate a
larger number of staff officers and enlisted men and women than before, to fully
carry out a wide range of missions, from operations other than war to the con-
ventional and fierce combat at sea.19 The MSO planned to provide optimum
space and state-of-the-art equipment and systems for the FIC, taking full ac-
count of the lessons learned in the four-ship Kongo (DDG 173) and two-ship
Atago (DDG 177) classes of Aegis DDGs, which were equipped with the first
generations of the FIC. The latest improvements were incorporated into the
Next DDH.
A new requirement for joint operations also emerged in the planning phase.
In 2002 the JDA launched an intra-agency, preparatory study on how to change
the JSDF from an independent, service-driven, operational posture to a joint
operational one. It was subsequently decided to shift to the new joint posture in
March 2006. Since the budget request for the ship was projected for JFY 2005,
the JMSDF had to make some provision in its design for joint operations, espe-
cially for embarkation of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters, or JTFHQ. It
would be inappropriate to have the JTFHQ and FIC in the same compartment,
because the JTFHQ would command on a strategic level, while the FIC would
mainly focus on tactical command of the flotilla. For this reason the MSO
planned a JTFHQ space, separate from the FIC. The MSO designated it as a
“multipurpose compartment,”envisioning its use also as a command post for both
military and civilian elements sectors in humanitarian-assistance and disaster-
relief operations, in Japan or abroad. The multipurpose compartments reflected
these diverse requirements.
With respect to communications, especially antenna locations, the ship
would have a large number of various types of antennas, including for satellite
communications and different radiofrequency bands. The MSO sought opti-
mum positions, expecting that the larger size of the Next DDH would ease com-
petition. Placing antennas had been a common problem in destroyer designs.
Weapons Systems
JS Hyuga, as the first ship of the Next DDH program, employs the FCS-3 (with
surveillance and fire-control functions), the Mark 41 Vertical Launching System
(VLS), and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile as its antiair weapon systems. It has
two sets of the 20 mm close-in weapons that are standard on other JMSDF ships.
The FCS-3 is a state-of-the-art fire-control system, with four sets of phased-array
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multifunction radars. It also has a combat-direction capability to support the
ship’s CIC and FIC.
Antisubmarine warfare, however, is of course the ship’s primary mission. The
biggest issue when the eight ships/eight helicopters concept was first discussed
was the role of the first-generation DDH in ASW—that is, whether it should de-
vote itself to being a command ship, with its own operational capabilities limited
to those of its three helicopters, or should conduct prosecution of contacts along
with other ships in the formation. The first-generation DDH was a large ship
(seven thousand tons) but retained the general characteristics and capabilities of
ordinary destroyers. So this problem was resolved then quite easily. This time the
story was a little more complicated. Since the Next DDH was a large, carrier-like
combatant (twenty thousand tons), with enhanced helicopter operations capabil-
ity and improved command functions, its role could be considered to be similar to
that of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) of the U.S. Navy.
But the main missions of a U.S. Navy CSG are strike and power projection,
not antisubmarine warfare. If a CSG gains an ASW contact, its CVN is supposed
to leave the area to continue its mission. Carrier-borne helicopters, destroyers
and frigates with antisubmarine helicopters on board, and a supporting SSN
may take measures against the contact, but the remainder of the force leaves the
area to protect the CVN. In contrast, the main mission of the JMSDF is ASW;
when a flotilla gains contact, designated ships, whether DD, DDG, or DDH, rush
to the detection site and conduct a prosecution, together with HS assets. Need-
less to say, no JMSDF unit, including the Next DDH, has the luxury of leaving a
contact site to other ships’ aircraft. The missions of the Japanese and U.S. forces
are completely different. In the most severe case, in fact, a JMSDF flotilla might
send two or three groups of destroyers to multiple contacts (two to three ships
each), together with their helicopters, and the Next DDH would have to operate
alone, or nearly so, in the possible proximity of an enemy submarine.
For this reason, the ASW weapons systems of Hyuga are similar to those of a
DD. These are a hull-mounted, very-low-frequency sonar (active/passive) as the
primary sensor, ASROC (launched vertically in the Mark 41 VLS), two sets of
triple torpedo tubes, and countermeasure systems. Of course, its optimum role
on a submarine contact spot, in a real operation, would be support of the flotilla
commander. In fact, it has been asked since the start of the program, “Is there re-
ally a need to install short-range triple torpedo tubes on the Next DDH, which is
substantially a light carrier?” But if we compare the mission of a JMSDF flotilla
with that of a U.S. Navy CSG, the answer is very clear.
The table gives orders of battle, showing what has changed and not changed
in JMSDF ASW flotillas and their destroyers from the days of the original eight
ships/six helicopters concept to today.
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ISSUES TO SOLVE
When planning the Next DDH, now Hyuga, the MSO had studied various op-
tions, such as a deck-edge elevator, a port-side exhaust for the port gas-turbine
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2 of 4 flotillas completed All 4 flotillas completed All 4 flotillas to be completed
Key: ASST: antisurface surveillance and targeting; ASUW: antisurface warfare; CIWS: Close-In Weapon System; ESM: electronic support measure; ESSM: Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile; SAR: search and rescue; SDPS: sonobuoy data processing system; SSM-1: domestically developed SSM; TT: torpedo tube; (V): vertical
launch.
Note: As of December 2010 there were six Aegis DDGs and two Tartar DDGs in the JMSDF Fleet. Expected remaining service life of the two relatively young Tartar
DDGs is about 10 more years. So it is right to estimate that the DDG force of the JMSDF will remain the same until the early 2020s.
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power plant, and airflow deflectors on the flight deck. Give the limitations of
cost and size, the MSO came to the conclusion that the current configuration of
Hyuga was the best. However, the following issues remain for the future.
Multiple Functions. One of the important characteristics of JS Hyuga is its multi-
purpose command functions—for JTF command and humanitarian-assistance/
disaster-relief coordination, as well as ASW flotilla operations. Since before its
commissioning, some publications in Japan have emphasized Hyuga’s potential
goodwill function. In fact, however, the ship’s “multipurpose” characteristics,
which were added onto its original maritime combat capability, refer to its
adaptability as a large, carrier-like combatant for a variety of situations. For in-
stance, it is reported that the JSDF Joint Staff Office and other services of the
JSDF have requested that additional accommodation for combat vehicles and
troops be built in.
In general, the Hyuga-class ship is large enough to accomplish most new tasks
that are proposed, even now that its specifications have been determined. How-
ever, from a force-planning and operational-requirement viewpoint, precise
consideration should be given. Hyuga is built as part of the eight ships/eight he-
licopters concept; its fundamental requirement should be developed under that
framework—its capabilities as a flotilla flagship, as a platform for extensive ASW
helicopter operations, and as an ordinary combatant capable of ASW and
self-defense AAW. New tasks proposed by other services that tend to change the
Hyuga-class DDH from a combat-oriented destroyer variant to a primarily mul-
tipurpose ship, that could trade its original war-fighting capabilities for others,
should be carefully examined and if necessary declined. An appropriate balance
is necessary.
An Aircraft Carrier? Some say: “If the JASDF employs F-35B [the STOVL ver-
sion of the Lockheed Martin Lightning II, formerly the Joint Strike Fighter]
fighters in the future, Hyuga and its sisters should operate them and so achieve
any capability as a STOVL aircraft carrier, or ‘STOVL-CVX.’” That would be jus-
tifiably supported in terms of full exploitation of resources on hand. It is natural
for any armed force to plan for the maximal use of its existing systems—in this
case, STOVL fighters and through-deck HS carriers that are large enough to op-
erate them. This is the true charm of military planning and execution. In any
case, such flexibility is necessary for joint missions. If a military organization
cannot so operate when necessary, it cannot be said to possess military expertise.
Service personnel cannot and should not say no to a mission that is given
them—they have to carry it out, fully utilizing all assets currently available.
Having said that, however, it was quite uncertain whether the JASDF would in-
troduce the F-35B at all. As of December 2010, the JASDF has only made requests
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to the United States and other nations in the joint development group for release
of F-35 information necessary for future decisions on next-generation fighters.
So, it is fair to say that though JASDF would most likely try to introduce the con-
ventional F-35A for its own mission, it still is unclear whether it and the govern-
ment will ultimately decide to do that. So the dream of JASDF F-35Bs on the Next
DDH remains an improbable one.
And after all, Hyuga is primarily an antisubmarine combatant, planned un-
der the eight ships/eight ASW helicopters concept. It is essentially different from
an aircraft carrier built for strike or air defense. In the future, should Japan, in a
changed security environment, need a (light) aircraft carrier within the scope of
the nation’s constitution, it should build one. Even then, the government and the
JMSDF would be obligated to explain thoroughly its necessity to the Japanese
people, to gain their full consensus and support. In terms of healthy civilian con-
trol, the introduction of a new system or ship of such significance as a (light) air-
craft carrier should be accompanied by thorough and public discussion.
Terminology. Recently, an old, and yet new, naval term, hachi-hachi kantai (eight/
eight fleet), has been widely spreading within the JMSDF and the Japanese media.
The ostensible reason seems to be simply that hachi in Japanese means
“eight.” But this phrase designated a force-planning concept of the Imperial Jap-
anese Navy in the 1910s—the days of sixteen-inch guns, such as those on the
battleship Nagato and carrier (converted battle cruiser) Akagi.20 This was a pe-
riod of tonnage and gun-caliber arms races among the major naval powers. This
eight/eight fleet concept was to build up a formation of eight battleships and
eight battle cruisers as a core of the Combined Fleet. Eventually, the plan was
abandoned under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.
But today’s basic tactical unit of the JMSDF, while superficially similar in the
numbers involved, is based on the JMSDF’s operational concept and so is com-
pletely different from hachi-hachi kantai posture of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Thus the term hachi-kan hachi-ki taisei—eight ships/eight helicopters pos-
ture—should be used instead. When the author served at sea in the early days of
this posture—as a combat systems officer on board a brand-new Hatsuyuki-
class DD (1984–86, as a lieutenant commander) and commanding officer of a
ship of the class (as a commander, 1990–91)—the expression hachi-hachi kantai
was strictly prohibited in the JMSDF—as was thought required by a proper un-
derstanding of, and respect for, the naval history of Japan.
AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF SECURITY
The road to Hyuga originated in the CVH concept immediately after the foun-
dation of the JMSDF in 1954. It passed the milestone of the first-generation
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DDH, then the DDV of the At-Sea Air Defense Posture Study, and the efforts
that followed. Finally, fifty-seven years after the foundation of the Japan Mari-
time Guard, Hyuga was realized as a carrier-like helicopter destroyer. Since its
commissioning, expectations for Hyuga have been increasing inside and outside
of the JMSDF. Also, criticism of Japan’s possession of an “aircraft carrier” has
been made by several surrounding nations. Yes, it is true that this ship has a
through-deck and is the largest combatant in the JMSDF’s history, but it still is a
helicopter destroyer, planned and built under the long-standing operational
concept of the JMSDF, and it is not almighty. Hyuga is not, for reasons described
in this article, a carrier in a traditional sense.
Also, the seemingly stubborn, even inflexible, nature of force building in the
JMSDF might be questioned. Is the ASW-oriented rationale that the JMSDF has
so long maintained still good enough? Does it meet today’s complicated security
environment and its diverse and challenging missions? My answer is yes. Except
for power projection and strike, which require specialized assets (such as U.S.
Navy–style CSGs or amphibious forces), antisubmarine warfare is the most so-
phisticated and difficult kind of maritime operation. Any navy or maritime
force capable of ASW as its primary mission is necessarily able to carry out other
missions as well, ranging from traditional at-sea combat to counterpiracy or hu-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief. In other words, a naval force built upon
high-end concepts can manage a wider range of missions than can one built
upon low-end doctrine. In practice, the JMSDF is able to deal with almost all of
the maritime missions, threats, and warfare areas that have emerged during the
last two decades. The JMSDF has augmented its capabilities with various new
disciplines, such as special operations, cyber warfare, and ballistic-missile de-
fense, beyond the scope of antisubmarine warfare alone.
Over and above all this, the strategic concept of the JMSDF is to maintain a
complementary relationship with U.S. naval forces. The current nature of re-
gional submarine forces makes ASW still vital to the security and safety of U.S.
naval forces in the area. Even with continuous and uninterrupted effort—oper-
ating on a “24/7” basis, in war, contingency, crisis, or peace—we can barely man-
age to maintain a favorable ASW environment. There is no specific remedy for
the submarine threat. As an ally and partner of the United States and its navy, the
JMSDF bears a heavy burden in this task, which has been an indispensable ele-
ment of security of the region and will remain so in the future.
It is important to remember that a characteristic of maritime operations is flexi-
bility. The JMSDF, like many other navies, can organize any type of force for any
given mission by combining ships of the most appropriate types. A JMSDF force
composed of some optimal combination of ships—perhaps Hyuga, the Aegis DDG,
other destroyers, an Oosumi-class LST, or a Mashyu-class fast combat support
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ship—could complete almost any possible mission in any waters on the planet. In
Hyuga and its sisters the JMSDF has a world-class capability. The key for the future
is to make this type truly capable, and to establish an optimal operational posture.
The flood of construction of carrier-like multipurpose ships, like JS Hyuga,
in the world’s navies may cause concern about a new “carrier arms race.” How-
ever, as we have seen, each navy must formulate, like the Japan Maritime Self-
Defense Force, its own strategy and force-planning rationale for this type of
ship, taking account of contemporary security circumstances and the tendency
toward expanded naval missions. Through-deck multirole ships—not the
strike-oriented carriers of several navies—are the most suitable for deepening
international coordination and collaboration among navies.
NOTE S
This article represents the personal opinions
of the author and not any official position of
the JMSDF or the government of Japan. The
author expresses special appreciation to Mr.
John Niemeyer, a special adviser to the Com-
mander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, for sub-
stantial contributions to the English text of
this article.
1. The Japan Maritime Guard (JMG) was estab-
lished in the Japan Coast Guard on 26 April
1952. On 1 July 1954, the JMSDF was inau-
gurated within the Japan Defense Agency, to-
gether with the ground and air self-defense
forces. Boei Hakushyo [Defense Whitepaper:
Defense of Japan], English-language version
(Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2008),
pp. 542–43.
2. The new constitution of Japan, which re-
placed the Meiji constitution, came into ef-
fect on 3 May 1947 in occupied Japan. Article
9 prohibits Japan from having armed forces:
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese peo-
ple forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes.
“In order to accomplish the aim of the pre-
ceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.” Available at
www.kantei.go.jp/.
The government’s interpretation of article 9
is that the constitution bans “wars of aggres-
sion,” not “wars of self-defense.” Accord-
ingly, the JSDF—designed to act only in the
defense of the nation if it is attacked—is
purely a constitutional entity; collective view
of the Hatoyama cabinet, submitted 22 De-
cember 1954, reprinted in Boei Handbook of
2009 [Handbook for Defense 2009] (Tokyo:
Asagumo Shinbunshya, 2009), chap. 12, “Po-
sition of Government of Japan on Defense of
Japan,” p. 604.
3. Ibid., “MTDBP (2001–2005),” document
I-1-(4), p. 17.
4. Ibid., pp. 19–50.
5. Canadian Navy, www.navy.forces.gc.ca/.
6. The first assignment of the author as a newly
commissioned ensign in the JMSDF in 1973
was as main propulsion assistant on board JS
Mochizuki (DDA 166), which carried two
DASH aircraft. One of the ship’s DASH offi-
cers called himself an “ace” because he
crashed three of them in accidents during his
tour (apparently considering three friendly
drones in exercises equivalent to the five en-
emy aircraft destroyed in combat tradition-
ally required for that honorific). This gives a
good indication of the poor reliability of the
system in those days.
7. Hiroshi Nagata, “Kaijojieitai DDH unyokoso
no hensen” [History of the DDH Operational
Concept in the JMSDF], in Sekai no Kansen
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[Ships of the World] (Tokyo: Kaijin-shya,
July 2001), pp. 69–71.
8. Ibid., pp. 71–72.
9. See Yoji Koda, “Jieikan no Genyu Seiryoku to
Shyorai Tenbo” [The Present and Future of
JMSDF Ships], in Sekai no Kansen (January
2009), p. 125.
10. Ibid., pp. 125–26.
11. Boei Hakushyo [Defense Whitepaper: Defense
of Japan] (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 1987),
p. 193.
12. Yomiuri Shinbun, 3 January 1988.
13. The Asagiri-class DD (JFY 1985) cost 43 bil-
lion yen, the newest Tartar DDG (in 1983)
about 69 billion yen. In comparison, the cost
of the first Aegis DDG, when requested in
JFY 1988, was estimated to be 122 billion yen,
2.8 times that of a conventional destroyer and
1.8 times that of a Tartar DDG—a very ex-
pensive project for Japan and the JMSDF.
14. When the JFY 1988 budget was passed by the
Diet, a captain responsible for plans, policy,
and programs within the JMSDF said (the
author, then a commander and an action of-
ficer in the Aegis DDG program, recalls this
remark as if it were yesterday), “This does not
mean our loss. It is our great victory to have
been able to secure budget for a first Aegis
DDG. The next chance will surely come fif-
teen years from now when JMSDF will re-
place our first DDH Haruna. A lot will be
expected of younger generations who are
now from lieutenant to captain.”
15. The LSTs of the Miura class (2,500 tons fully
loaded, three ships) and the smaller Atsumi
class (1,800 tons, three ships) were designed
to a World War II concept and were built in
Japan. Their main characteristic was their
ability to beach. This capability facilitated
loading and unloading of vehicles and per-
sonnel, at the cost of extremely slow speed.
These ships’ design maximum speed was
fourteen knots; however, their cruising speed
was actually about ten knots, due to their flat
bottoms. JMSDF LSTs are officially desig-
nated “transport ships.”
16. See Koda, “Present and Future of JMSDF
Ships,” p. 129. The concept of Maritime Op-
erational Transport is to deliver JGSDF rein-
forcement units to an area where an enemy
landing is possible or probable, or where an
enemy has already landed but that is still un-
der Japanese control. The point is that the
landings would be on Japanese territory, not
foreign soil. So, in theory, this concept does
not involve amphibious assault. The tempo
of helicopter transport and the types of heli-
copters required would be very different from
those in an assault amphibious landing.
17. Boei Handbook of 2009, p. 128.
18. The author was director general of the Oper-
ations and Plans Department in the MSO
(having been assigned in January 2001, only a
month after the MTDBP was approved). The
cabinet decision had fixed only characteristics
and numbers, not the ship’s design—the
through-deck was just one of the JDA’s ideas.
The government, the JDA, and the MSO
agreed that the design would be decided only
later, at the time of the budget request. “This
irks me!” I told myself; “By all means we will
realize the through-deck ship, which has been
the long lasting goal of the JMSDF.”
19. The authorized personnel strength of flotilla
headquarters was calculated on the basis of
flotilla operations as a training force in peace-
time. In particular, the number of flag
watch-standers needed for long-term opera-
tions was not considered—only that required
for exercises and training evolutions of lim-
ited duration. This reality reflected the posi-
tion and policy of the government until the
end of the Cold War—that is, not to deploy
the JSDF on any real-world missions other
than responses to direct aggression against Ja-
pan. With the end of the Cold War, the gov-
ernment reviewed its policy and started
deploying forces on various international
missions. Even so, due to shrinking budgets
and a difficult recruiting environment, only
slight increases in flotilla staffs could be man-
aged. To address this gap, the JMSDF decided
to form mission-oriented headquarters for
each real-world deployment, such as support
operations in the northern Indian Ocean/
Arabian Gulf and antipiracy off the coast of
Somalia. Extra staff members would be
added, depending on the given task. None-
theless, the above-mentioned deployments
involved only one or two destroyers and an
oiler; the Combat Information Center of a
destroyer is adequate for the commander of a
force that size. Next DDH is the first ship to
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have a “king size” FIC for full-scale flotilla
operations.
20. For a widely read Western account, see David
C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun:
Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Impe-
rial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), esp. chap.
6.
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